Students and Politics in Indonesia and Korea*

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There has been a growing recognition both in Western capitals and in the developing countries themselves of the surging emotions and the political power of the youth, and particularly the students, in the developing countries. This has long been recognized as a factor in the Latin American scene. But in Asia, the political role of students has been less clearly defined by tradition or experience. The recent manifestations of student activity in Asia, therefore, have been less easy to categorize. Student activity has been a major factor in political situations in Vietnam, Korea, Indonesia and—to name a "developed" country—Japan in the past few years. Some of this unrest stems from the insecurity, uncertainty and general uneasiness that seem to have gripped students in many parts of the world today. In each of the cases in Asia cited above, however, the motivations, the organization, and the issues that have moved students into the political arena have been different.

It is all too easy to generalize, but it is clear from two cases in Asia—Indonesia and Korea—that underlying the student movement in politics is a whole system of education and change in developing countries that inevitably sets apart the new generation as a distinct and restless entity. At the same time, the political direction of this new generation is shaped in each case by other factors: by the political situation around it, by the organizational forces that seek to control it, by the culture and character of the individual nation itself.

Until recently, one might have described the student influence in Indonesia as one of potential rather than actual significance. Student organizations have been splintered, their traditions confused. Their political activity, moreover, has long reflected the strong outside influence of the established political forces in the country. This situation was exemplified in 1960 when President Sukarno called the Youth Congress that organized the National Youth Front. The Front was ostensibly to represent the youth of Indonesia as a "functionally independent and organized political group." But the Congress was in fact the scene of considerable maneuver by the chief political forces in Indonesia—particularly, in this instance the President and the Army. The competition that took place at the Congress and its

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outcome were indicative of the political efforts that have been carried on among the youth groups. The key issue at the Congress was the organization of the proposed Youth Front. The Palace had proposed that a centralized organizational structure be adopted. Army-supported and independent groups, and even Communist Party (PKI) representatives (who were quietly supporting the President on other issues at the Congress), became wary of this approach. In the end, a combination of Army-backed and Moslem groups succeeded in establishing a federated structure in place of the Palace proposal. The result in effect was to perpetuate the struggle for control of the youth movement.

The Youth Congress of 1960 demonstrated that neither students nor organized youth in general represented an independent force in Indonesia. The youth were subject to the same political forces as the rest of the country and were controlled to the same extent by the balancing of these forces. Nevertheless, for the multitude of student and youth organizations throughout the country, the indecisive outcome of the Congress had represented a kind of lease on life. On this, as on other occasions in which they were buffeted by political pressures, Indonesian youth leaders demonstrated a desire, and a somewhat amazing ability, to retain some elements of independence and to avoid at least being wholly captured by any one force.[1]

The swift train of events following Indonesia's abortive coup of October 1965 led to the dismantling of the Government-influenced National Youth Front, and brought to the fore the Moslem and other groups which had drawn more closely to Army influence in recent years. But these events served even more fundamentally to bring into the limelight for the first time the whole question of student influence on the political situation in Indonesia. The student demonstrations in the winter of 1965-66 focused on employment and economic opportunity in addition to the politics of the coup and the counter-coup. As such they were distinctive and served to concentrate student action on a problem general enough but one in which the new student generation has a peculiar stake. There are today no less than fifteen million college, secondary and elementary students in Indonesia compared to only a handful a generation ago. This new generation has a new higher level of expectations—expectations which are not going to be easily fulfilled and are just beginning to have their impact on Indonesia's political life. It is this that makes the direction of student political action so important in Indonesia.

To understand the possible nature of this impact, it is necessary to understand the make-up and motivations of the Indonesian students. The students are by and large an unsophisticated group and their ambitions are narrow. The reasons for this lie in the education system and in the political-

[1] For an interesting account of Indonesia student reaction to an earlier attempt at exploitation by the left, see Pran Sabharwal, *Little Bandung, A Report on Asian African Students Conference* (Delhi: University Press, 1956).

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economic situation in which this system has functioned. Since 1951, the Indonesian Government has engaged in a tremendous educational effort which has raised the country's literacy rate from 4 to over 50 percent. There has been alongside this explosive opening of educational facilities an equally significant growth in motivation. Under the Dutch colonial administration, education was the path which only a few could realistically hope to follow to the élite of the bureaucracy and power. With independence and the opening of educational opportunities for all, the idea was spread that the road to professional opportunity had also been opened to all. Education thus acquired a tangible significance that it had not had under the Dutch: "At the beginning of each school year in the Dutch colonial period, teachers used to chase children to get them to primary school; now the parents are chasing the teachers to get their children to school."[2]

The expectations developed in the past fifteen years, however, are already beginning to be frustrated. One aspect of this is the limited number of jobs available. Despite the tremendous increase in government opportunities that arose with independence, these opportunities have failed to keep up with the increase of population and tremendous growth of literacy and education facilities. The bureaucracy has nevertheless of necessity continued to be the principal focus of students' ambitions. Economic development has been too slow and political discouragement too great to have permitted the growth of a significant private professional and entrepreneurial class to help absorb the new literate generation. This narrowing of professional opportunities has had two effects. As primary education became extensive, the area of competition and demand shifted to secondary and higher levels: whereas before the Second World War an appropriate elementary education would almost assure an Indonesian a government job, today one has to finish secondary school even to hope for a position. Second, student ambitions have become invariably tied to the State and educational objectives are increasingly geared to meeting State requirements.

A second and closely related problem contributing to frustration is the quality of education available. The bitter irony in the rush for better employment through education is that it has led to the rise of so many inferior educational institutions that even the slim chance of getting into the bureaucracy is frustrated by the poor quality of the education received. The rise in educational institutions in Indonesia has been phenomenal, a large part, significantly, accounted for by private schools, which attests to the tremendously increased demand. In Jogjakarta, for example, between 1950 and 1958 the number of elementary schools rose from 491 to 830. Of these, the rise in private elementary schools was from 0 to 125. During the same period, high schools in the area rose from 4 to 53; 49 of the 53 were private. Clearly, many of these institutions are operating on the wave of an over-

[2] Selosoemardjan, *Social Changes in Jogjakarta* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 392.

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whelming popular demand with little else to recommend them. "There are private schools where the standard of teaching is so low that the percentage [of students passing the government entrance exams] has never risen above zero, and yet these schools continue to enjoy a full enrollment."[3]

A similar situation exists at the university level. There are two major universities in Indonesia: The University of Indonesia and Gadjah Mada University. Besides these are a number of smaller colleges and schools, some in the outer islands, but most in Java. Some of these smaller colleges are good respectable institutions and have the advantage of being closer to the students than the large informal institutions. But many are of very poor quality, merely attracting students who because of lack of finances or academic ability or other reasons are unable to attend the better universities but are desperately interested in attaining that all-important degree and hopefully from there a job within the bureaucracy. Even the better institutions suffer from the fact that most of the faculty must hold down two or three different positions to earn an acceptable salary, which naturally diminishes their effectiveness. The Government, moreover, has undertaken to establish state colleges in each of the country's twenty-eight provinces, a laudable undertaking from the point of view of promoting popular education, but a project which will undoubtedly spread the nation's scarce academic talent even thinner.

In addition to institutional shortcomings, the low standards of education are aggravated by the general shortage of textbooks. Textbooks are too expensive for the average student to buy unless supplied in quantity for political reasons—for example, the large supply (in English) of Russian books. While the Indonesians are at present organized to produce few textbooks of their own due to lack of financial support and appropriate research arrangements, the importing of textbooks has been hampered not only by cost but by the Government's sensitivity to foreign, particularly Western, books in the social sciences. The low-cost textbook-import programs carried out by U. S. Government agencies, for example, have been restricted largely to technical subjects.[4] University, college and secondary school libraries do not even begin to fill the gap, many lacking even a basic set of reference-works in the major fields.

Neither the availability of jobs nor the quality of education, however, had until recently become the real focus of student and youth organizations. These groups have been more representative of the variety of social and political cross-currents of Indonesian life than of a student or youth "class" interest. No less than fifty-seven different national organizations were represented at the 1960 Youth Congress while provincial delegates had been

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 367.

[4] The one notable exception has been Samuelson's *Principles of Economics* which is probably the most widely circulated Western book in Indonesia.

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selected to represent hundreds of local organizations. The principal youth groups have had some relationship with prominent political parties, and many have religious affiliations. There are also some important national federations and some de facto affiliation of local groups with some of the more prominent national organizations. But despite these relationships, most of the organizations are small associations primarily loyal to one or a few local leaders and having rather imprecise objectives. Regionalism, religion and other social characteristics are usually more significant than national political orientation.

Among the principal national youth groups, the four most prominent are offshoots of the major (though now officially inactive) political parties: Pemuda Demokrat (Democratic Youth) which is PNI; GPII (Islamic Youth Movement) which is Masjumi; GP Ansor (Ansor Youth Movement) which is NU; and Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth) which is PKI. Each of these parties also has had a separate prominent university student organization. The first three parties—PNI, Masjumi, and NU—have been officially banned for some time, and now the PKI has been outlawed. Whether the youth groups will retain firm loyalty to these parties over a long period of time if they in fact remain dormant is questionable. As long as education and State employment remain so closely linked for the great majority of students, the mass of them will likely tend toward organizations which can promise some type of opportunity for their members. That some of the senior members of the PNI, Masjumi and NU have remained in this position even after the parties were banned, has been a key factor in enabling these parties to maintain their influence among the youth organizations. For the PKI, now banned from active Government participation at any point, the task will be somewhat different. At the same time, the position of the Army—formerly most influential on the outer islands—has now become considerably stronger.

But these shifts in power in themselves will no longer govern the situation. Even the political groups which do have power will be hard put to satisfy the expectations of the students as a whole. The intensified frustration will thus rub against the Government as well and open the door to influence from anti-Government forces. But most of all, the situation will likely spur efforts toward a more coordinated and unified student movement seeking its own independent voice. These efforts will be prompted by a growing recognition of common problems but also by the nature of the other alternatives open to them: on the one hand is the Army—an important and not unenlightened ally for many groups over the past few years but a difficult focal point for a budding intelligentsia; on the other extreme the PKI, with its controversial domestic and international overtones and now legally beyond the pale; and in the middle a number of prominent individuals and skeletons of political organizations but still too amorphous politically to be really attractive. In addition, having tasted the sense of

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power for the first time in the post-October period, students will increasingly incline toward independent direct political action.

But the Indonesian students will find it difficult to develop a meaningful independent voice. They have not had the opportunity really to broaden their horizons under the present system of education, and they have been largely closed off from the inflow of fresh new ideas from outside. They will find it difficult, moreover, to identify positive alternatives in the political scene in the near future. And they will of necessity, being preoccupied with their own ambitions and interests, be torn in their attitudes toward those in power. As such, they are potentially a very restless, ambivalent, and unhappy group in Indonesia's body politic, goading the Government for ends they can only generally define but for which they cannot really prescribe, while subject to the constant struggle for their allegiance by outside established political forces but with any one of which they are unable comfortably to make their home.

The comparison between Korea and Indonesia is revealing in many respects. Korea's educational development since independence has been even more comprehensive than Indonesia's and though starting from a considerably larger base—22 per cent literacy in 1945—has been similarly explosive. In Korea today over 80 per cent of the population is literate. Against 15 per cent in Indonesia, 22 per cent of Korea's total population is in school. Over 95 per cent of elementary school-age children are in school, compared to 46 in 1941. The number of middle and high schools has increased over eleven times since 1945 and the number of students fourteen times. In higher education, the number of institutions has increased nearly ten, and the number of students eighteen, times over the level of 1945.

The greater accent on higher educational development distinguishes the Korean scene. The importance of higher levels of education is indicated by the number of students who go on from one level to the next: 54 per cent of the elementary school graduates go to middle school, 67 per cent of middle school graduates go to high school, and 32 per cent of high school graduates enter college. Not surprisingly, in Korea, a college degree is nearly a prerequisite for a regular civil service job and for a start in most of the private professional occupations. Both in the general spread of higher education and in the percentage of expenditure allocated to it, Korea is one of the highest countries in Asia and exceeds the European average.[5]

While Korea's educational system has been developed extensively both horizontally and vertically, it suffers from some of the same problems as Indonesia's and also from some peculiar ones of its own. In Korea, the problem of quantity versus quality is a critical one. While over 95 per cent of Korea's elementary school age children are in school, nearly 60 per cent are

[5] "Long-Term Projections for Education in the Republic of Korea," *Report of the UNESCO Regional Advisory Team for Educational Planning in Asia,* Bangkok: UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Asia, 1965, p. 13.

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in classrooms having more than 60 pupils, and 14 per cent in classrooms with more than 80 pupils. Almost a quarter of the elementary schools run on two- or three-shift systems; shifts are the rule rather than the exception in the larger urban areas.

The problem is equally serious—perhaps more serious in its ramifications—at the higher levels. In this respect, there is not as sharp a break in Korea as in Indonesia between a very few schools and a great many poor ones. Three universities—Seoul National, Yonsei and Korea—clearly stand out in reputation and in general all-around quality. But perhaps six or eight colleges and universities on the next rung are above average, some perhaps better than the top three in certain fields. Similarly at the secondary level, the tiers of quality are graduated. One reason for this is that the education system is not nearly so geared to a single objective—the bureaucracy—as in Indonesia. Indeed business and other non-Government fields increasingly offer financial and other advantages to the graduates over the bureaucracy. Consequently, the education system has served a broader area and itself has been broadened. A second reason is that private, and in many cases foreign, influences—such as the extensive missionary influence—have been operative for some time in developing traditions and outlooks in education well in advance of independence and the rapid build-up of educational facilities. Yet the problem of quality at the secondary and higher level is still serious.

The quality problem shows up in several ways. At the college level, there are the all too familiar problems of overcrowding, shortage of faculty and the problem of faculty members holding several appointments or outside jobs to maintain an appropriate income level. In the twenty years from 1945 to 1965, while college enrollment increased eighteen times, the number of college faculty increased less than five times. Shortage of textbooks, equipment and adequate faculty training have also contributed to limited sophistication at the upper levels even while the demand for education has been increasing the number of specialized colleges, graduate schools, etc. Finally, as a result of these conditions as well as a contributing factor to them, there has been at best a confusion of academic standards and at worst a lack of real professional discipline governing the standards of research and teaching at the higher levels of education.

Three factors underlying and contributing to this situation in Korea are of particular note. One is the plethora of influences which have had their impact on the education system in a short period of time. The traditional Korean cultural influence up to the twentieth century, the Japanese influence during the colonial period 1905-1945, the missionary and other foreign influence during and after this period (a number of leading institutions, e.g., Yonsei University, were founded by Westerners), the American influence during the military occupation government (1945-48) and through assistance-programs thereafter, and the independent Korean influence and

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management since independence in 1948. These influences have produced a number of cross-currents, e.g., between Japanese-, Western- and Korean-trained educators, and philosophies which have never fully been synthesized in the education system.

A second notable factor is the economic base of the education system. Nearly all the elementary schools in Korea are public, but the ratio changes and is eventually reversed as one goes higher. Only about 60 per cent of middle schools are public, 55 per cent of high schools, and just 20 per cent of colleges and universities. But while the system of private education is well developed, the establishment of endowment, donation and other non-tuition financing practices is not. As a result, the private institutions (even those whose primary concern is not profits) must meet their expenses almost entirely through tuition fees. This understandably encourages a tendency to maximize enrollment and minimize dismissals. Even the better institutions are inclined to participate in these practices while naturally those of poorer quality are hardly conscientious about them. The Government has attempted to meet this problem by establishing an enrollment level for each school (though, until recently, it also put a limit on tuitions), but many institutions have simply violated the enrollment ceilings. The effect on students is not only to produce overcrowding but in many institutions to reduce the real academic requirements upon the student to obtain his degree.

The third factor is the emphasis of study. At both the high school and college level there is a decided emphasis on liberal arts and the humanities. Strenuous Government efforts, and significant developments in the economy, have worked to alter this in recent years. College graduates in science and engineering, for example, represented 24 per cent of the total in 1965 compared to only 14 per cent in 1958. Still, a heavy concentration in the social sciences and the humanities remains and has several ramifications. First, this allocation of training does not necessarily correspond to the economic requirements of the country and thus translates itself into unemployment or unsatisfactory employment for a large number of graduates. The available data, unfortunately incomplete, show only 58 per cent of college graduates of 1965 known to have been employed (including graduate school, army, etc.) three months after graduation while 14 per cent are known to be unemployed. Significantly, the ratio of employment to unemployment was nearly eight to one for engineering graduates compared to two to one for social science and less than two to one for humanities, fine arts and literature.[6]

Even allowing for significant gaps in the data, the existence of a large number of college graduates at loose ends is an important phenomenon in

[6] Ministry of Education, Republic of Korea, *Annual Survey of Education, 1965*. The data are drawn only from school records, nearly 29 per cent of the total graduates being shown as "unknown."

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Korea, and even where the data do not exist to back it up, the belief that the problem is even more serious than it apparently is exists in many students' minds. Second—to make a very dangerous generalization—social science and other liberal arts students are on the whole more politically conscious and active than students in engineering, business education and science. In other words, the situation at present creates a large pool of politically conscious students, sometimes less than well educated, and insecure about their own futures.

This situation appears, in its general aspects, not too dissimilar to Indonesia. The pattern of student political action, has also had some similarities to Indonesia though at different periods of time. Prior to 1960, the Korean students, like Indonesian students in more recent years, were seen in the front ranks of campaigns and demonstrations that were largely Government-inspired. Then in 1960, in the April uprising against the Rhee regime, the Korean students entered the political arena in a truly independent and self-organized fashion, changing significantly the role and character of student involvement thereafter.

But a number of important differences in the Korean scene suggest that it would be a serious mistake to equate too closely the pattern of student movements in the two countries. One difference, already alluded to, is that the general educational level and sophistication of Korean students is above that of their Indonesian counterparts. Other differences exist as well in the attitudes, organization and environment of student political action.

The April 1960 student uprising, probably more than any other incident, has shaped Korean students' outlook on their own role in politics. The uprising occurred in an atmosphere stifling from the effects of authoritarian rule and the disintegration of political morality. The students in effect spoke for the nation when they rose up against the regime, and they received overwhelming support. It was largely in this experience that they developed a sense that the students are, as one observer has put it, "the conscience of the nation,"—a sense which has remained in the minds of student leaders ever since. This conviction has been apparent in subsequent student mass actions which have been relatively selective and focused on particular issues of overriding national concern. The most important since 1960 were in 1964 and 1965 over the issue of Korea-Japan relations which to the students raised the most fundamental issues for the nation.[7] It has also been apparent in the fact that after the demonstrations of 1960 and again in both 1964 and 1965

[7] The Korea-Japan normalization issue is too complex to treat adequately here. In very general terms, for the students, the issue raised serious questions about the eventual prospects for Korea's unification, future independence from Japanese economic domination, and the ulterior motives of those conducting the negotiations for Korea. The relative openness surrounding the negotiations and the prospective articles of agreements in 1965, compared to 1964, undoubtedly, by robbing the issue of much of its suggestion of "behind the scenes" impropriety, was a factor in reducing the level of student and popular support for the demonstrations from the previous year.

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there was no real interest in forming a permanent coordinating body to maintain a national student role. Government discouragement of such attempts is undoubtedly a factor. But the Korean students themselves do not seem as disposed as their Indonesian counterparts to develop a national student movement in order to play a continuing role in politics. The accent is rather on spontaneous (though, in fact, well co-ordinated) student mass actions which seems to add to the sense of being a moral rather than simply another competing political force.

The unity and coordination evident in the student demonstrations since 1960 is striking in light of the student organizational structure which is at least as fractionalized as in Indonesia. Student groups in Korea are typically small—perhaps a few hundred members at most—and rarely cross school lines let alone federate into national groups. The organizations are often focused on an individual or a leadership-group and often are related as well to the regional origin of the members. Classmate and other college associations are also important. The ties created in these groups, incidentally, last long after graduation from school. Formal student ties with political parties are outlawed—a fact which circumscribes direct political proselytization among the students, though some obviously goes on. But the link-up between prominent youth-groups and national political forces that has existed in Indonesia has not occurred on any large scale in Korea. This fact has served to give the Korean student groups more independence. It has also helped eliminate a phenomenon common in Indonesia (and other countries) not seen very much in Korea, i.e., the professional "youth" leader who may in fact be as much as thirty-five years old.

The difference in the character and force of factionalism and regionalism—and conversely nationalism—in the two countries also helps explain the differences in the character of student action. In Korea, regional, age, school, and kinship ties operate to prevent strong, unified organizational development not only among students but throughout the society. Yet these divisive forces rest on the need for personal security and advantage, and derive their form from familiarity and closeness. None of them are ipso facto in conflict with Korean nationalism which is a strong force among the students. As a result, in Korea, it is not impossible—especially among a highly motivated and restless group like the students—to obtain agreement on crucial national issues and a strategy for mass action, though it might be much more difficult to obtain organizational unity for sustained action of a less dramatic character. In Indonesia, the case is much different. Although kinship loyalty and personal security are strong motivating factors in group associations, religious and regional ties in Indonesia have strong characters of their own and often run contrary to a sense of national unity, e.g., the fear on the outer islands of Javanese domination, the strong feelings about religion in relation to the state, etc. In sum, Indonesia tends to have large groupings or federations on regional or religious lines which find it difficult

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to unite on single national issues, while in Korea there are apt to be only small independent groups united on nothing but nationalism.

Together with this, geographic circumstances are also a factor. Seoul is the controlling center of Korea's government, finance, business, and education. It wields an influence over Korea that Djakarta simply cannot wield over the far-flung islands of Indonesia. The leading universities and 90,000 of a total of 140,000 of Korea's college students are in Seoul. By contrast, not even both of the two major universities in Indonesia are in Djakarta. The potential for concentrated student action, with immediate national significance in Korea, is thus clear, while the difficulties of similarly effective concentrated action in Indonesia are equally apparent.

Finally, there is the influence of the overall economic and political environment. In the last three years, Korea has experienced a growth-rate of over eight per cent annually, a relative stabilization of prices, a rapid rise of exports, and the development of a quite sophisticated and promising Five-Year Plan for 1967-71. In the international sphere, Korea has begun to play a different and more independent role, with its commitment of troops to Vietnam, the organization and hosting of the Asia and Pacific (ASPAC) Ministers meeting, and a more vigorous policy among neutral countries in Africa and elsewhere. These developments cannot but affect student outlook and the level of anxieties and action. Some student leaders have already commented that 1965 may have represented another turning point in student action. With the great and intensely emotional issue of Japan now behind them, and with recent economic and political developments, the students are beginning to reappraise their situation and to become even more selective in choosing issues on which to assert themselves in the future. Potentially acute issues are not impossible to discern—unification, corruption, a failure in the democratic system. Nor can one overlook that the students are, for the reasons pointed out above, a still restless and insecure group upon whom changes in the economic and social scene may produce greater immediate response than among other groups. But Korean students are not now on the brink of action. They are not now inclined to action, in other words, without a cause.

In Indonesia, the prospects are only slim that the next few years will see such dramatic development of the economy and institutions as Korea has seen in the past few years. Nor is the political situation yet settled enough to promise a period of general stability. The students will be poised on the edge of this situation and their role in it far more uncertain to them than their Korean counterparts can begin to see for themselves. The incidents of the winter of 1965-66 in Indonesia, moreover, cannot be expected to have the same unifying and uplifting effect on students as the April 1960 uprising had in Korea. The former had inevitably a divisive aspect, tinged with elements of civil strife and internal bloodshed. It is unlikely, therefore, to be the rallying point for all students in the years to come. But even where

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they have been major participants, students are very often more the victim than shapers of events. The Korean students were very much bewildered observers during the first few years after 1960—through the turmoil of the Chang Myon Government and the military coup of 1961 and its aftermath. Indonesian students may have to face a similar period before they can begin to see their role more clearly and begin to play it effectively.

One final word might be said generally on the role of student political action in developing countries. Student action in these countries, as can be seen from the cases of Indonesia and Korea, is often more than simply the expression of student anxiety or of the "younger" generation. The students represent a new and distinct élite from their forebears, a group more differentiated from their parents in education, expectations and outlook than their counterparts in the industrialized countries. Moreover, they often serve as a vehicle for much more than their own views. In developing countries, very often the social, institutional, economic and political bases for effective group action—whether by political parties, economic pressure-groups, etc.,—are very limited. The students, on the other hand, are peculiarly well situated for group action, and as such often serve as a channel of expression in place of other vitally needed outlets. Students, of course, do not always serve this role well: they have their own special concerns, they are often manipulated from outside, and they are sometimes irresponsible. But even taking these weaknesses into account, student movements could play a vital constructive role in the process of political development if they would serve as an intermediary institution of political expression and action until the development of a fully functioning and representative pluralistic political system. But one must admit that it would impose one more task upon the already overburdened education systems in these countries to suggest that the responsible development of this role might become a recognized and integrated objective of the educational process.

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